Impact of security considerations on foreign policy crafting
To be sure, Sri Lanka is in a tight policy bind as a result of initially granting the Chinese high tech vessel, ‘Yuan Wang 5’, permission to dock at its Hambantota Port for a week, beginning today. The decision did not prove divisive until India objected to it; apparently, over questions relating to its national security.
Consequent to India raising objections, Sri Lanka has requested China to defer its vessel’s Hambantota Port visit, but quite understandably the Chinese side has taken offence at this change of stance by Sri Lanka. Among other things, China has called on India to ‘stop pressuring’ Sri Lanka over the vessel’s visit, which it claims is for purely scientific exploration purposes.
Essentially, the Indian position is that its security interests could be compromised as a result of the Chinese high tech vessel being in a position, once it docks in Hambantota, to bring under close surveillance vital Indian infrastructural assets on the country’s southern coast in particular, such as nuclear power plants and ports. Sri Lanka reportedly received messages of protest by India to the effect that the Chinese vessel possessed the capability ‘to track satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles’, besides other strengths.
China, for its part has explained, among other things, that the vessel’s visit is part of ‘the cooperation process’ between China and Sri Lanka, which is ‘independently chosen by the two countries and meets common interests. It does not target any third party.’ It added that: ‘Sri Lanka is a sovereign state. It can develop relations with other countries in the light of its own development interests.’
Sri Lanka is bound to see the merit in China’s argument but given its regional policy compulsions it cannot afford to be seen as being at cross purposes with India either. India and China are number one powers and considering Sri Lanka’s geographical proximity to both states, besides its dependence on them in a number of vital areas, it cannot be seen by either of these global powers as being insensitive to their best interests.
A classic small state dilemma, the commentator is prompted to observe. Bluntly expressed, however, Sri Lanka is in a state of utter helplessness in this situation where it cannot afford to offend either of these major powers. But in fairness to Sri Lanka it needs to be said that she has tried to be as ‘Non-aligned’ as possible while relating to the big powers concerned; it’s simply that, given her degree of dependence on them, she is in no position to say ‘No’ to either of them.
Sri Lanka’s damage controllers, if there are any, may need to act swiftly, positively and proactively. They will need to use their best diplomatic skills to facilitate an empathetic response from China in particular to the policy quandaries confronting Sri Lanka in the Yuan Wang 5 connection. Essentially, the message to both countries should be that no wilful harm has been intended to them by Sri Lanka.
This is not going to be the first occasion on which a worrisome tangle of this acuteness in the regional policy sphere is likely to confront Sri Lanka. Going forward, how will it manage quandaries of this magnitude? This is an issue of the highest urgency and complexity. It is compounded by the fact that being in an utterly helpless economic situation, Sri Lanka does not possess any rescue options worth speaking of. While the country needs to persevere with Non-alignment as best as it could, and as the saying goes, be ‘a friend of all’, it would be only working against its best interests by being unaware of the priorities of its closest neighbours and shaping its relations with them accordingly.
Needless to say, India is our closest neighbour and merits extra-carefulness and sensitivity on Sri Lanka’s part when dealing with it. The lessons of the late seventies and early eighties should be fresh in the minds of Sri Lanka’s policy and decision-makers, lest past regional policy blunders are repeated. Put briefly, security concerns prompted India to figure prominently in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict in those times.
Ideally, Sri Lanka should have been left alone to sort out the issues that grew out of its ethnic conflict. But Sri Lanka’s then rulers opted to seek the assistance of some Western intelligence agencies in their fight against the LTTE, which was seen by India as posing a threat to its security interests. Thus, was set in motion a period of antagonistic relations between India and Sri Lanka. This troublesome spell was defused somewhat with the signing of the 1987 Indo-Lanka peace accord.
There are some fundamental truths in foreign policy formulation that need to be addressed by Sri Lankan policy and decision makers, along with the local public, as the country moves into the future, particularly in the face of the current crisis situation. These truths need recalling particularly on account of the fact that some local sections see China and India as dealing with foreign policy questions in basically different ways. For example, China is seen as non-interfering in the internal affairs of countries in this context, while India is perceived as taking ‘a political stance’ on the relevant issues.
This is a misleading understanding of the reasons that compel these countries to adopt the seemingly different stances on the issues in question. To be sure, China is generally ‘non-interfering’ in the affairs of countries but this policy position grows out of what it sees as its best interests.
China prefers non-intervention in the internal politics of countries, for example, because it wishes the world to adopt a hands-off policy with regard to its own affairs as well. That is, China’s policy of non-involvement in the domestic affairs of other countries is dictated by its self-interest, which translates into its national interest. A country’s foreign policy is best understood as an instrument that serves its cherished interests. In China’s case its foreign policy revolves around ‘non-involvement’.
On the other hand, it is in India’s best interests to be concerned about developments in the South Asian region, since being the largest country in the region, it has a phenomenal and wide-ranging asset base to look after. Thus, national security is very much an integral part of India’s foreign policy. Accordingly, an ideal foreign policy is non-existent. Foreign policies are as diverse as the numerous states’ best interests are diverse. Thus, facile labeling of countries is difficult when it comes to foreign policy.
